imposition in the philosophic theory; it is the placement of an unreal figure of things on a reality, of a mirage upon the bare desert air, of the figure of a non-present snake on the present and real rope.

The world, we may contend, is such a hallucination, an imposition of a non-existent unreal figure of things on the bare ever-present sole reality of the Brahman. But then we note that in each case the hallucination, the false image is not of something quite non-existent; it is an image of something existent and real but not present in the place on which it has been imposed by the mind's error or by a sense error. A mirage is the image of a city, an oasis, running water or of other absent things, and if these things did not exist, the false image of them, whether raised up by the mind or reflected in the desert air, would not be there to delude the mind with a false sense of reality. A snake exists and its existence and form are known to the victim of the momentary hallucination: if it had not been so, the delusion would not have been created; for it is a form resemblance of the seen reality **to** another reality previously known elsewhere that is the origin of the error. The analogy

therefore is
unhelpful; it would be valid only if our
image of
the universe were a falsity reflecting a
true universe
'which is not here but elsewhere or else
if it were a
false imaged manifestation of the Reality
replacing
in the mind or covering with its distorted
resem-
blance a true manifestation. But here the
world
is a non-existent form of things, an
illusory